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OPTING IN OR OPTING OUT: THE NEW LEGAL
PROCESS OR ARBITRATION
GERALDINE SZOTT MOOHR*
Professor Krotoszynski suggests that judicial legitimacy has fallen victim
to the expectations of multiple constituencies, who evaluate judicial
competency on the basis of particular substantive results.1 These “outsider”
constituencies— feminists, critical race scholars, queer theorists, critical legal
studies scholars, and law and economics advocates— have effectively
demonstrated the deficiencies in the judicial system.2 While applauding their
contribution to a fairer and more just society,3 Professor Krotoszynski
laments the damage to judicial credibility and the absence of common
ground that makes dialogue across constituencies increasingly difficult.
Taking a page from sporting events,4 he sees a newly defined legal process as
our “best hope” for devising a legal system that multiple constituencies will
find fair, thus restoring confidence in judicial determinations.5 Reflecting this
preference, he expresses “grave doubts” about recommendations that cultural
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center; B.S., University of Illinois; M.S.,
Bucknell University; J.D., American University.
1. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for
Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 998 nn.15-16 (2000).
 2. See id. at 1003-08 (tracing scholarship that developed from Critical Legal Studies movement).
 3. See id. at 1008.
 4. Professor Krotoszynski’s confidence in process is bolstered by the model of sporting events, in
which losers accept decisions because the process is perceived as fair. See id. at 1010-27.
As he notes, women have complained about the use of sports analogies in law. See id. at n.7. Many
people, myself included, do not find such analogies persuasive, but view them as rather mystifying allusions
that obscure the issue. Those who do not follow or participate in sports are excluded from a dialogue that
rests on such analogies; they are without the experience that allows them to grasp the point and thus to
participate. There is thus a certain irony in using a sports analogy in a discussion that addresses the concerns
of outsiders.
Interestingly, a brief discussion with students disclosed their perception that sports and law were
similar in their negative, rather than positive characteristics, such as the significant role that money plays in
fielding a team, be it of players or lawyers, and the use of vague standards in determining outcomes. Cf. id.
at 1019-20 (noting vague standards used to evaluate performance of figure skaters); Allen St. John, Dumb
Boxing Decisions: Fight Scoring Looks at a Ticket to Palookaville, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999 § 4 at 5
(noting vagueness of scoring criteria in boxing matches).
The sports analogy used here generalizes across sports, although Professor Krotoszynski concedes that
wrestling is an exception that “proves the general rule.” Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1013 n.76. Recent
headlines suggest, however, that at least one other sport fails to provide a model of fair process. See Ronald
Smothers, Prosecutor Seeks Takeover of Boxing Group, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999 at A1 (stating that
members of International Boxing Federation were recently indicted on racketeering, bribery, and extortion
charges for accepting bribes for moving boxers up in the rankings). As a result, federal prosecutors in New
Jersey are asking a district court to place the organization under judicial oversight. Id.
Fortunately, the analogy is not fundamental to Professor Krotoszynski’s argument.
 5. See Krotoszynki, supra note 1, at 1002.
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minorities and commercial entities embrace arbitration.6 My response
comments on the new legal process and on the possible exodus to arbitration.
I. OPTING INTO THE NEW LEGAL PROCESS
Professor Krotoszynski loosely defines process as the way judges go
about their task of deciding cases,7 a set of principles that define the method
judges use to generate legitimate decisions.8 Process is an inclusive concept:
an “aggregation of all elements of the litigation process, including the judges,
the parties, the procedural rules, and the substantive rules.”9 Despite these
elaborations, the parameters of the new legal process— and the topic to be
discussed— remain unclear. Moreover, it may be unwise to expect too much
from process.10 Even Professor Hart, the principal founder of the Legal
Process school, recognized the limitations of process. As he famously
remarked: “What sense does it make to insist upon procedural safeguards in
criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made a crime in the first
place?”11 A legal proceeding can be exquisitely fair and still result in an
illegitimate decision because of a failure in substantive law. Although recent
scholarship has effectively demonstrated the absence of bright-line
distinctions between substance and process, a broad conception of process
might include the points at which process and substance merge.
Professor Krotoszynski’s definitions of legal process become less elusive
when considered in conjunction with the narrower problem presented by
judicial discretion.12 While conceding that adjudication is not quite analogous
to refereeing in a sporting event,13 he recommends that the new legal process
take a lesson from those who referee games, whose discretion is “tightly
 6. See id. at 1036.
 7. See id. at 1002.
 8. See id. at 1009 n.63. These “rules of the game” include sources and rank order of authority
invoked by judges as well as formal rules of evidence and procedure. See id. at 1010 n.68.
 9. Id. at 1010 n.68.
 10. The reasons for the demise of the legal process school speak volumes about the limitation of
process. See id. at 999-1000 (remarking on Weschler’s use of legal process theory to attack racial
discrimination decisions in late 1950s); id. at 1003 (noting numbers of state and federal judges that failed to
implement the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments).
 11. Henry M. Hart, Jr. The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 431 (Winter
1958). Professor Krotoszynski defines legal process as encompassing, but not limited to, procedure.
See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1010 n.68 (stating “process values” are not limited to procedural
due process).
 12. See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1028-31; see also id. at 1025 (stating that judicial discretion is
“antithetical to . . . the Rule of Law”).
 13. See id. at 1028 (noting judges face new situations and problems that result from changes in
technology and society); see also id. at 1030 (noting judicial duty to do substantive justice in individual
cases).
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cabined.”14 Thus, the new legal process would appear to include rules that
constrain judicial discretion.15
While more sanguine than Professor Krotoszynski about judicial
discretion,16 I agree that the new legal process should encompass measures
designed to constrain the discretion of decisionmakers. A promising starting
point is to consider a central complaint of outsiders: legal standards often fail
to respond to the reality of non-majoritarian lives because judges and juries
apply majority norms— variously called standards, pre-conceptions, or world
views— when determining outcomes that involve and affect outsiders.
Two examples illustrate how legal standards can fail to acknowledge and
thus account for the real lives of women and gays and lesbians. Both
examples concern claims of sexual harassment, which is barred by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 The prohibition against sex discrimination
includes severe or pervasive sexual harassment that creates an abusive or
hostile work environment.18 A two-part test determines whether the conduct
at issue resulted in a hostile working environment. The first part of the test is
subjective— the plaintiff must demonstrate that she perceived her workplace
environment to be hostile or abusive.19 The second prong is objective— the
plaintiff must establish that a reasonable person would also find the
environment hostile or abusive.20 Thus, it is insufficient that a woman thinks
she has been subjected to a hostile working environment; she must also
establish that a reasonable person would think that the harassment created a
hostile environment.
Feminists have argued that a more accurate determination would be
obtained if the objective standard were that of a reasonable woman.21 They
 14. See id. at 1027 (noting referees’ discretion is constrained by formal rules, public enforcement, and
an obligation to explain).
 15. See id. at 1031.
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 65-72 (discussing beneficial effects of judicial discretion in
context of Title VII).
 17. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, national origin, or sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
 18. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (establishing hostile environment sexual
harassment as violation of Title VII because it is discrimination based on sex). For sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
 19. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
 20. See id.
 21. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1203-05 (1989); Susan Estrich, Sex At Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 845-46 (1991)
(noting that the construct of reasonable person is “at best meaningless . . . [and] at worst, it implies that the
reasonable person is male”); see generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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have argued, and at least one circuit court has agreed, that a sex-blind
reasonable person standard is inherently male-biased.22 A woman’s
experience is different from that of a man; for one thing, it includes greater
physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion.23 That experience also
includes living in a society that is marked by a high incidence of rape and
sex-related violence and the presence of a vast pornography industry that
portrays women as sexual objects.24 For these reasons, women are likely to
think that references to sexuality in the workplace are improper and often
find them an anguishing experience.25
The use of the reasonable person standard ignores factual predicates of
women’s lives and thus fails to acknowledge the reality of their experience.26
Indeed, the reasonable person test expressly directs the factfinder not to
consider the reality of a woman’s experience.27 Consequently, the resulting
determination may be flawed because it is simply inaccurate.28
The second example, provided by Professor Spitko, also involves the
reasonable person standard, but as applied to cases of harassment by a gay
supervisor.29 The reasonable person test makes it likely that the factfinder
will judge sexual comments or behavior more harshly when same-sex
harassment is alleged than when the alleged harasser is of a different sex
from the victim.30 Given the minority status of homosexuals, the reasonable
person is, in theory and in practice, a straight person with a heterosexist
 22. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting conduct many men consider
unobjectionable may offend many women). Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may not fully
appreciate the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive. See id.
 23. See Abrams, supra note 21, at 1205.
 24. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (noting also that women are disproportionately victims of rape and
sexual assault).
 25. See id. (noting also that as a result of their experience, women tend to hold restrictive views of
when sexual conduct is appropriate).
 26. The Supreme Court has cast the test in terms of reasonable person. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
 27. Another example of the way law ignores the reality of women’s experience is found in the
criminal offense of rape, whose essential elements, typically “sexual intercourse or contact, force, and non-
consent, remain largely unchanged.” Estrich, supra note 21, at n.2. Judicial interpretation of the force
element imposes the male notion of a fight as an operative definition of force. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL
RAPE 65 (1987) (concluding that the reasonable woman standard is that of “real man”).
 28. The practice of utilizing tests that expressly ignore the experience and reality of women’s lives
might be compared to the practice of testing airbags only on men. See generally Patrick J. Norton, Note,
What Happens When Air Bags Kill: Automobile Manufacturers’ Liability for Injuries Caused by Air Bags,
48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 659 (1998); The Family That . . ., HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 7, 1999, Bus. at 1
(stating that National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has proposed testing airbags on “family” of
dummies that includes children and women).
 29. See E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the
“Reasonable Heterosexist” Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56 (1997).
 30. See id. at 84.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/4
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world view.31 A jury is likely to be wholly composed of people who are not
gay and who have little or no exposure to openly gay people.32 In these
circumstances, the reasonable person standard is likely to reflect the mores of
the heterosexist community, allowing the factfinder to utilize prevailing
preconceptions about gay men and women.33
The use of the reasonable person standard in sexual harassment law
works to the detriment of women and of gays and lesbians. It makes it more
difficult for women to establish a hostile environment claim and more
difficult for a gay person to escape the accusation of sexual harassment. The
common problem is that the combination of a malleable and imprecise
standard, together with unchecked discretion, allows the factfinder to decide
the issue by reference to the norm of the reasonable male heterosexist.34
A legal process that purports to address the concerns of cultural minorities
should include constraints on the natural tendency of judges and juries to
impose their personal views and limited experience on factual issues. Once
tests or standards that fail to account for an outsider’s experience are
identified, ameliorative measures to constrain the discretion of the factfinder
may be devised. For example, in the case of female plaintiffs, the standard
could be changed to that of a reasonable woman or expanded to include a
reasonable person in the “same situation or similar circumstances,” which
would allow the factfinder to consider the sex of the alleged victim.35
Professor Spitko suggests that when the alleged harasser is gay or lesbian, the
factfinder should be instructed to view the situation as though the conduct
were directed at a person of the opposite sex.36 The devices suggested here,
while far from providing a complete solution to the problem of unconscious
cultural or gender bias, would remind factfinders of their obligation to think
beyond their own experience.
Thus, a preliminary conception of new legal process should include those
tests and standards against which the substantive law is measured. While
Professor Krotoszynski refrains from defining process to this extent,
including substantive tests and standards in a new conception of process
 31. See id. at 82.
 32. See id. at 83 (noting social and cultural segregation of gay America from non-gay America, and
that it exists because it is desired by non-gay America).
 33. See id. at 84.
 34. See I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1159
(1991) (defining heterosexism as “institutional valorization” of heterosexual activity).
 35. This test was once favored by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See
MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 646 (4th ed. 1997)
(commenting on the withdrawal of the controversial EEOC proposed guideline).
 36. See Spitko, supra note 29, at 94-96.
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appears consistent with the spirit of his proposal.37
 II. OPTING OUT OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION: OUT OF THE FRYING PAN AND
INTO THE FIRE
Professors Spitko and Ware advise cultural minorities and commercial
specialists to use private arbitration to resolve disputes rather than the public
judicial system.38 Both believe that their constituents will obtain more
acceptable decisions in arbitration. Professor Krotoszynski argues, on the
other hand, that resolving claims in arbitration increases the potential for
misunderstanding and prejudice, from which society as a whole suffers.39 I
agree that choosing arbitration over litigation is unwise, at least as arbitration
now operates, and I share Professor Krotoszynski’s concern about the threat
to community interests.
Professor Spitko views arbitration as an escape from the application of
majoritarian norms to gay and lesbian claimants. He finds arbitration a
welcome option because parties may choose decision makers who
understand the minority culture; accordingly, arbitration could conceivably
provide more acceptable results than litigation in the public courts.40
Arbitration, however, may not produce decisions acceptable to cultural
minorities. Procedural rules affect any method of adjudication, and in
arbitration the rules have limitations that can make a significant difference in
the outcome of a claim.41 Even the informality of arbitration may work to the
 37. See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1008 n.60 (noting “a new process theory of straight white men,
for straight white men, and by straight white men will not be adequate to the task at hand”).
 38. See E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 294-
97 (1999); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83
MINN. L. REV. 703, 745-57 (1999).
 39. See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1037 (noting best interests of community are not served by
policy of disengagement and withdrawal). He also believes that deserting the judicial system would harm
those who are forced to remain in litigation and exacerbate the legitimacy problems of the courts. See id. at
1041.
 40. See Spitko, supra note 38, at 296. Professor Spitko considers the problem of a gay testator
who wishes to leave his estate to his male partner. See id. Relatives who challenge the will use the
“nebulous” legal doctrines of mental capacity and undue influence to invalidate the bequest. See id. at
283. Judges and juries, through a combination of “ignorance, fear, and loathing,” are likely to view the
bequest through a heterosexual mind’s eye. See id. at 288-89 (noting “pre-understanding” that gay
relationships are principally mere sexual encounters rather than permanent and familial).
 41. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 679-80 (1996) (noting arbitration procedures influence
substantive rights); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contracts of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1036-43 (1996) (noting due process
deficiencies of arbitration procedures).
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disadvantage of members of minority cultures.42
A typical arbitration hearing is informal, and parties may not invoke rules
of evidence or procedure.43 Arbitrators generally prefer to hear all the
evidence, even when it is prejudicial or irrelevant. Further, discovery is very
limited, the arbitrator has only limited subpoena power, and there is virtually
no motion practice.44 Arbitrators generally do not award punitive damages,45
and are known for a tendency to compromise on damages. Finally, arbitrators
do not provide a reason for their decision, and the decision is virtually final.
In fact, arbitration is even less like refereeing a game than is litigation; there
are no formal rules and no obligation to explain the decision.
Admittedly, parties to arbitration may circumvent these procedural
traditions. Arbitration is a creature of contract, and parties can stipulate to
any procedures,46 including the scope of judicial review.47 But adding
procedures that mimic those available in litigation adds expense and forfeits
finality, the defining characteristics of arbitration. The expensive hybrid that
results may be too costly for non-commercial litigants.48
I also agree with Professor Krotoszynski that long-term interests of the
minority community and the larger community are better served by litigation.
I have argued that arbitration is not an appropriate forum in which to decide
employment discrimination issues, even when the forum serves the interests
of the parties.49 Even when statutory law is not involved, judicial
 42. See Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1388 (noting that informal procedures expose
minorities to biases of decision-makers).
 43. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 401-04 (1999) (discussing arbitration procedures).
 44. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (conceding that arbitration
procedures limit discovery).
 45. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1, 15-22 (1997) (noting competing policy arguments for and against arbitral awards of punitive
damages).
 46. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting parties
may stipulate to whatever procedures they want, “short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more
doubtful, by a panel of three monkeys”).
 47. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding court must
honor arbitration agreement under which parties agreed to standard of judicial scrutiny exceeding that
allowed by Federal Arbitration Act).
 48. See Moohr, supra note 43, at 454-56 (evaluating prospect of judicial review of arbitration awards
in employment discrimination cases).
Arbitrators, who are paid by the parties, also have a financial incentive to decide claims in a way that
protects their future employment. The exchange of financially disinterested judges and juries for financially
interested arbitrators may not be in the best interests of both parties. See id. at 460, n.9.
 49. See generally Moohr, supra note 43. While that argument is directed to a statutory scheme in
which the individual litigant serves as a private attorney general, some of the advantages of litigation apply
also to common-law resolutions. Perhaps the most compelling example of judicial common-law
development that changed public attitudes is the law of products liability. See generally G. EDWARD
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p1099+Ragazzo.doc 03/22/00   9:28 AM
1094 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1087
adjudication develops substantive law, creates precedent, produces uniform
law, educates the public, and forms public values.50 Legal development in
substantive law can clearly serve the interests of minority communities. In
the long-run, development through litigation of a uniform precedent that
educates and informs public values is more likely than arbitration to integrate
the interests of cultural minorities into the legal system.
Two characteristics of judicial adjudication account for its effectiveness
in developing law and changing public attitudes. First, public litigation is
public,51 in both senses of the word; it is not confidential and it operates with
the authority of the state.52 Second, trial courts are part of a unitary,
hierarchial judicial system in which legal errors can be corrected.53
Judicial adjudication stimulates and produces legal development, largely
because courts “speak” to one another. In a hierarchial legal system, reasoned
and recorded decisions are available to other courts; indeed, their use by
other courts is often required. The development of the same-sex harassment
cause of action illustrates the process.54 As noted above, the Supreme Court
established a cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment in
1986. Early decisions held summarily that Title VII did not provide a cause
of action for same-sex harassment.55 Eventually, a lively judicial dialogue
emerged in which judges debated arguments and counter-arguments for the
right to sue in cases of same-sex harassment.56 The Supreme Court recently
resolved the conflict between the circuits and held that same-sex harassment
is a form of sexual discrimination when the harassment occurs because of the
victim’s sex.57
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1990).
 50. See Moohr, supra note 43, at 427.
 51. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Public Adjudication, 6 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 42, 75 (1988) (noting trial is public event in which publicly appointed judge renders
judgment by virtue of state authority).
 52. See Moohr, supra note 43, at 401-02.
 53. See id. at 435 (noting judiciary is ultimately accountable, absent constitutional issues, to public
and to legislators).
 54. Professor Spitko opposed the recognition of same-sex harassment. See Spitko, supra note 29, at
81 (arguing that same-sex sexual harassment cause of action would provide an “additional means for non-
gay people to regulate the sexual behavior of gay people”).
 55. See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding Title VII does not
cover same-sex harassment because statute was directed at power differentials between men and women).
 56. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that key inquiry is
“whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous employment conditions to which members
of opposite sex are not exposed”) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)); Wrightson
v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding claim of same-sex harassment may lie
when alleged harasser is homosexual); Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir.
1997) (rejecting Fourth Circuit standard and relying on whether harassment was because of sex).
 57. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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Another way legal development occurs through litigation is that courts
apply precedents from analogous cases to the issues before them. The
example of sexual harassment is once again pertinent. The Supreme Court
decision that created the hostile work environment cause of action was based,
in part, on a lower court decision dealing with national origin
discrimination.58 If Mrs. Rogers, the Hispanic plaintiff, had arbitrated her
case, the courts (or for that matter, the arbitrators) that were dealing with a
sexual harassment claim could not have utilized the previous decision. They
are unlikely to have known about a favorable or relevant ruling. Arbitration
decisions are not public documents. Rather, the awards are proprietary and
are seldom distributed to anyone but the parties. Even if they were generally
distributed, the awards would not be especially helpful to other courts and
litigants; they do not explain the reason for the decision, or even disclose
which of the claims was successful.
Legal development is an inevitable by-product of judging— whether
judges or arbitrators resolve the dispute.59 The acts of evaluating and
deciding oblige decisionmakers to articulate general principles and to
formulate interpretive guidelines.60 Nevertheless, arbitrators do not “create”
law; that is, they do not explain the reasons for decisions, record that
reasoning, and make decisions available to others. Private arbitrators have no
incentive to create law because the rules and precedents that would result are
public goods that are not appropriable by the arbitrator. Creating law through
progressive, carefully reasoned decisions is time-consuming and costly, and
in arbitration there is no viable mechanism by which the creator can recoup
that investment, much less earn a profit.61 Consequently, unlike courts, an
arbitrator in the present system has no incentive to create the public good of
The same-sex cause of action protects gays and lesbians from harassment by straight persons when that
harassment is because of sex. It also protects all employees, including gays and lesbians, from harassment
by gay or lesbian persons. Ironically, although a gay person may not be harassed, he may be fired. See
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089
(1990) (Title VII does not bar discrimination because of sexual orientation); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (same).
 58. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (establishing importance of employee’s working
environment)). The Supreme Court also noted that appellate courts had applied the Rogers’ principle to
cases involving race and religion. See id.
 59. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 236 (1979).
 60. See id.; David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2621
(1995).
 61. See Moohr, supra note 43, at 436 (noting absence of private market in law that requires collective
or government action to create rules and precedents).
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law.62
Courts also “speak” to the public to educate the community and form
public values. As courts develop new standards, they deliver them to the
community. The judicial system operates in open hearings, creates public
records, and provides reasoned decisions that explain the basis of judgment.
These results are recounted in newspapers and found in libraries and on
electronic databases. Publicity that accompanies a trial may educate the
public.63 Public litigation gives public values meaning and expression by
providing concrete applications of those principles.64 Finally, judges and
juries are effective in setting community standards because they speak with
the authority of the government.
In contrast, arbitration procedures are confidential, and arbitrators do not
provide reasons for their decisions. There is no publicity, no public hearing,
no record, and no explanation of the basis of the award. Not only would the
plaintiff in the first sexual harassment case not have been able to use Mrs.
Rogers’ case as an analogous precedent, the community would not have
known about, and thereby learned from, the ruling that emphasized the
significance of an employee’s working environment.
Experience indicates that litigation both develops substantive legal
change and alters public attitudes. In 1964, conservative legislators amended
the proposed Civil Rights Act to ban discrimination based on sex. Their
purpose was not to protect women from discrimination, but to use sexual
equality to highlight the absurdity of the legislation and thus to derail the
bill.65 Their effort reflected the public’s low valuation of sexual equality in
the workplace. Thirty-five years later, most reasonable people would regard
the rejection of sexual equality in the workplace as at best antiquated and at
worst hopelessly misogynistic. To put the matter simply, the ideal of sexual
equality in the workplace has won the support of the general public,66 and
 62. Professor Ware claims that arbitration will eventually develop a private market in law. See Ware,
supra note 38, at 747. He apparently assumes that the judicial system is static and will not evolve to respond
to the concerns of cultural minorities or specific commercial industries as a private legal system would.
While it is possible that a private market in law might develop, we have little evidence of its effect or
responsiveness, whereas the history of common-law adjudication indicates that the judicial system will
continue to develop a responsive procedural and substantive law.
 63. See Moohr, supra note 43, at 437.
 64. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Out of
Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1672-73 (1985) (stating adjudication uses state power to require reluctant public
to talk and to listen).
 65. See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 n.1 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(referring to eleventh-hour effort to destroy the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 110 CONG. REC. H2577-84
(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1965) (remarks of Reps. Smith, Tuten, Andrews, and Rivers); Estrich, supra note 21, at
817.
 66. This is not to suggest that development was entirely even or that it is complete. See General Elec.
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women now compete in the workplace for jobs and wages that were once
reserved for men.67 Judicial decisions that interpreted the broad mandate of
Title VII certainly deserve some credit for this change in public opinion.68
In these decisions, judges utilized their discretion to interpret statutes in
meaningful ways that achieved the goal of the legislation. Courts devised
procedures that enforced the rights conferred by substantive law.69 They
devised new theories of discrimination70 and accepted new ways that
plaintiffs might prove discrimination.71 Although complaints about excessive
judicial discretion and its contribution to legal indeterminacy are well-
grounded, we must also recognize that judicial discretion has been used to
protect and nurture minorities. Because judicial discretion can be used as a
sword or a shield, Professor Krotoszynski’s proposal for a more diverse
judiciary is particularly important.72
CONCLUSION
The debate over whether to opt in or out of the present judicial system
reflects the immutable, endemic dilemma of whether the law should privilege
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex
discrimination). Congress responded to Gilbert by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (October 31, 1978), codified at 41 U.S.C. § 2000e (k) (1994).
Despite the PDA, courts have yet to devise an acceptable response to employers who dismiss or otherwise
discriminate against pregnant employees. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737-38 (7th
Cir. 1994) (stating that termination of pregnant employee to avoid paying costs of maternity leave is not
discrimination because of sex).
 67. Again, the picture is not perfect and the process is not complete. See supra text accompanying
notes 21-28 (discussing reasonable person standard in sexual harassment); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (accepting argument that women were not interested in highly paid
commission sales jobs); Donna K. Ginther & Kathy J. Hayes, Gender Differences in Salary and Promotion
in the Humanities, AM. ECON. REV., May 1999, at 397 (suggesting that gender differences in income are
result of reduced probability of promotion among women).
 68. I would not, however, press the analogy between women and homosexuals too far. Not only are
women not a minority, but their presence in the community does not present as great a challenge to
heterosexist notions about sexual identity.
 69. See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (explaining
employers’ burden is to produce evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for decision); McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 125 (1976) (establishing elements of prima facie case of discrimination, which
shifts burden of producing evidence to employer in Title VII cases that present circumstantial evidence).
But see St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (limiting inferences that must be drawn from
employee’s prima facie case).
 70. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (establishing disparate impact theory of
discrimination, which does not require intent to discriminate).
 71. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (explaining that
statistical evidence is persuasive); Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-40 (1977)
(approving use of statistical proof in systemic disparate treatment cases).
 72. See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1050 (urging executive and legislative branch to ensure that
judicial appointees reflect diversity of community in which they will sit in judgment).
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the individual or the community.73 One may also view the dilemma as a
choice between short-run solutions and long-term development. In the short-
run, arbitration may solve an individual’s problem but the ruling and its
reasoning then do not apply to others. Conversely, long-term development
through litigation may sacrifice the immediate interests of individuals but
ultimately produce rules that apply to everyone in the community. Either
way, the choice is painful.
Exit strategies are attractive for those whose reality is not recognized or
fully appreciated by the majority culture or accounted for in the tests that
enforce substantive law because they rescue the individual from the tyranny
of majority norms. But not even Solomon could feel certain when forcing a
beleaguered individual to litigate rather than arbitrate, thereby foregoing her
interests for the good of long-term community interests.74 And those who
encourage opting out of the public system must feel disquiet in the realization
that their recommendation sacrifices potential long-term change that would
benefit members of both the cultural minority and the majority.
Professor Krotoszynski’s proposal is directed to those on both sides of
this debate— those who plan to work within the judicial system and those
who would choose another forum. His proposal for a dialogue about the
parameters of legal process is at once modest and ambitious. While modestly
cast as a request for engagement and debate, he effectively asks critics and
outsiders to accept process as the criterion for judicial credibility and to
abandon result-oriented evaluations of judicial decisions. The responses
printed here are a measure of his success in stimulating discussion of a
subject that merits continued development.
 73. Utilitarian theories of punishment are perhaps the starkest example of the choice between
individual and community. Under utilitarian theory, there is no limit to the punishment that may be
imposed, if the community benefits through the reduction of crime. See JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, § 2.03 (1987). Retributionists consider it unjust to use a person solely as
a means to an end. See id. at § 2.04 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE
100 (J. Ladd trans. 1965)).
 74. See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1027 (noting it understandable that minorities prefer to find
decision-makers with better appreciation of their problems rather than serve as grist for judicial mill).
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